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moral considerations (e.g., Ghoshal, 2005). Based on these criticisms, we explore the 
implications for CEOs with an M BA degree-specifically, if and how their M BA ed ucation 
might influence   their firms' corporate environmental performance (CEPJ. Extant literature 
provides conflicting arguments; therefore, we empirically tested the relationship using a 
sample of 416 S&P 500 CEOs and found a significant positive  association between CEOs 
with M BAs and CEP, even alter accounting for  several firm- and individual-level 
characteristics. In addition, post-hoc analysis revealed that the MBA program ranking 
had no effect on CEP. 
Disturbing indictments have recently been levied 
against business education, particularly  against 
 ple, Benn and Dunphy (2009) suggest that MBA 
programs do not adequately  prepare graduates to 
business   schools'  "mother-ship,"  MBA  programs deal with the challenges of sustainability issues in 
(Mintzberg,  2005).  Some have  pointedly  critiqued the workplace.  Giacalone  and  Thompson  (2006: 
MBA programs as irrelevant to the needs of prac-  268)  paint  an  even  darker  picture  by  arguing 
ticing  managers  (e.g.,  Mintzberg,  2004;  Pfeffer  & that our "organization-centered worldview" allows 
Fong, 2002) providing  f ew, if any, benefits  to the business f aculty to teach a profits-first perspective 
recipient or the organization (Dreher, Dougherty, & "without asking students to confront the factually 
Whitely, 1985; Leonhardt, 2000). Others suggest that impossible notions of unlimited growth in a world 
MBA education does have an effect on the recipi-  of limited resources, the questionable consumerist 
ent  by  creating  a  "profits-first"  mentality  (e.g., ideology based in materialistic goals, and the eco- 
Ghoshal,   2005;  Giacalone   &  Thompson,   2006). logically unsound tactics that may bring planetary 
These  scholars argue that  this  indoctrination  to-  suicide." These indictments are alarming, consid- 
ward the single-minded pursuit of profits, and ac-  ering the  positions  of  influence  in  large  corpo- 
companying  assumptions  of  opportunism,  are at rations occupied by many MBA graduates. 
least partly responsible  for the recent business While other avenues of environmental sustainabil- 
scandals and unethical executive actions which ity  are  pursued,  perhaps  none  has  a  greater 
frequent the popular press (Henle, 2006). influence  than  that  of  corporate  environmental 
While these criticisms provide significant cause performance  (CEP; e.g., a firm's use of recycled 
for concern, one other evokes a potentially  cata-  materials, compliance with environmental regula- 
clysmic consequence-how  MBA education could  tions). As a society, we recognize that the scale and 
influence environmental sustainability. For exam-  influence  of  our  largest  companies  are  greater 
than  that  of  most  nations,  and  as a  result,  these 
firms have a significant impact on our world's nat- 
ural  resources  (Samuelson,  2006). Therefore,  it  is 
important to ask, what will MBA graduates do with 
their positions of power over these vast resources? 
Based on the recent criticisms of MBA education, 
the  research  question  we  explore here  focuses on 
the   relationship   between   MBA   education   and 
CEP---and more specifically the MBA education of 
the firm's CEO. As primary  decision  maker  (Hos- 
mer,  1982; Mintzberg,  1978), the influence of  the 
CEO is particularly vital. The CEO not only plays a 
critical role in core business  strategies, but  also in 
social  and  environmental   strategies  and  resource 
allocation to such pursuits (Agle, Mitchell, & Son- 
nenfeld,  1999; Wood, 1991). Based on upper eche- 
lons theory  (Hambrick  & Mason,  1984), prior  re- 
search  has  found  that  CEO  characteristics  (e.g.. 
tenure,  functional  background,  international  expe- 
rience)  influence  selective  perception.  interpreta- 
tions,  decision  making,  and  ultimately,  firm  out- 
comes  including  social  outcomes  (Simerly,  2003; 
Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009). Extending this line of 
research,   this  study  considers   the  various   criti- 
cisms of  MBA education and multiple perspectives 
on  CEP  and  asks,  "What  is  the  relationship  be- 
tween CEO MBA education and CEP?" 
By exploring this question, our contribution is 
threefold. First. we introduce a new research ques- 
tion into the discourses on MBA  education and 
CEP. entailing important implications for both 
streams of research. Second, we address the asser- 
tion that MBA critiques have lacked significant 
empirical investigation (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002). To 
address this issue, we use a sample of 416 CEOs 
from the S&P 500 and put to a rigorous test the 
question of whether CEOs' MBA education predicts 
CEP. The results of the analysis provide support for 
some MBA criticisms and contradict others, lead- 
ing to important implications for educators, busi- 
ness, and society. Finally, our study moves beyond 
examining individual-level outcomes of education 
(e.g.. earnings, career trajectory) and examines a 
long-term organization-level outcome with societal 
implications for environmental sustainability. By 
doing so, it empirically examines a higher level 
outcome of MBA education than previous research 
currently provides. 
BACKGROUND 
Before exploring the potential influence of CEO 
MBA education on CEP, we review the literature to 
serve as a backdrop for  the ensuing arguments. 
First, we discuss a few select MBA criticisms. then 
the two predominant  paradigms  of  CEP. and fi- 
nally give a brief discussion of upper echelons 
theory. 
MBA Criticisms 
While a review of the entire volume and variety of 
MBA critiques is beyond our scope here, many of 
the recent criticisms which contribute to this dis- 
course can be condensed into two categories- 
irrelevance and a profits-first mentality. 
Irrelevance 
The irrelevance criticisms suggest that MBA edu- 
cation does not provide useful knowledge, skills, or 
abilities for management, and thus,  provides no 
individual or organizational benefit. Pfeffer and 
Fong (2002) have suggested that out of a desire to 
achieve respectability and legitimacy, business 
schools adopted the ways of social science depart- 
ments. As a result, research and teaching has 
moved away from practical relevance to accommo- 
date precision, control. and testable models. These 
sentiments have been echoed by Mintzberg (2004) 
who argues that MBA programs simply provide 
specialized training in functions of business and 
are unable to contribute to the broader practice of 
management. He also suggests that  management 
is a craf t that is learned and improved through 
experience, not in the classroom. Bennis and 
O'Toole (2005) also chastise business schools for 
treating management as a science rather than a 
profession and for hiring and rewarding faculty 
based on research records and not managerial 
experience. 
Many  have suggested  that  MBA programs  fo- 
cus far too heavily  on quantitatively  based  ana- 
lytical   techniques   to   the   detriment   of "sof t 
skills,"  such  as  interpersonal   and  communica- 
tion   skills,  which   are  essential   for   managers 
(e.g.. Jenkins & Reizenstein,  1984; Porter & Mc- 
Kibbin, 1988; Simpson, 2006). Rubin and Dierdorf 
(2009)  found  empirical  evidence  that   supports 
these  arguments,  suggesting  that   competencies 
such   as   "human   capital   management."   which 
are  most   valued   by  practicing   managers,   are 
underrepresented   in  MBA  programs.  Similarly, 
Navarro (2008) found that the MBA curricula of 
top-ranked  U.S.  business  schools  lack  emphasis 
on "sof t skills." In addition, Navarro (2008) also 
found  the  curricula  lacked  multidisciplinary  in- 
tegration,  which  leads  to  the  creation  of  func- 
tional  silos within  business  school education. In 
short. the  irrelevance  criticisms  suggest  that  the 
knowledge,  skills. and abilities necessary  for ef - 
 
   
 
f ective management are lacking in MBA 
education. 
 
Profits-First 
The profits-first criticism is most notably attributed 
to Ghoshal (2005). who suggested that our over- 
whelming acceptance of economics-based para- 
digms, such as agency theory and transaction-cost 
economics has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
creating graduates who seek profits first. and at 
any cost. Ghoshal (2005: 76) laments that "by prop- 
agating ideologically inspired amoral theories. 
business schools have actively freed their students 
from any sense of moral responsibility." Similarly. 
Giacalone and Thompson (2006: 267) refer to the 
propagation of an "organization-centered world- 
view" (OWV) in which business is the foundation of 
the modern world: 
 
We teach students to perpetuate business' im- 
portance and its centrality to society, to do so 
by increasing wealth . . . only in the back- 
ground are other stakeholders and positions 
discussed, although generally within this 
economic context. At the top of our values 
hierarchy is money and all of its constituents: 
power, status. and the accumulation  of 
wealth (Giacalone & Thompson. 2006: 267). 
 
Finally, Mitroff (2004: 185) refers to the creation of 
"a mean-spirited and distorted view of human na- 
ture," which assumes "that at their core humans 
are completely and entirely ruthless, motivated 
solely by greed, opportunistic, purely selfish, and 
it should come as no surprise, totally out for them- 
selves and no one else." 
The empirical evidence generally lends support 
to the prof its-first criticisms (for an exception see 
Neubaum. Pagell, Drexler. McKee-Ryan, & Larson, 
2009). For example. research suggests that more 
exposure to economics-based courses-which are 
founded on profits-first imperatives and assump- 
tions of opportunism-leads to more free-riding 
(Marwell & Ames, 1981), less cooperation (Frank, 
Gilovich. & Regan, 1993). selfish behavior (Carter & 
Irons, 1991), and engaging in corrupt behavior 
(Frank & Schulze. 2000). Contributing further evi- 
dence are studies finding that MBA students are 
more likely to cheat in their coursework than non- 
business student peers (McCabe, Butterfield, & 
Trevino, 2006), and the greater emphasis that is 
placed on financial success, the greater the likeli- 
hood to cheat (McCabe & Trevino, 1995). Perhaps 
some of the most condemning evidence is findings 
suggesting  that  in their  pursuit  of  profits,  as a 
 
greater proportion of a firm's top management 
team possesses MBAs. the more a firm engages in 
illegal activity, such as safety and health viola- 
tions (Williams, Barrett, & Brabston. 2000). In short. 
these criticisms and empirical results support the 
notion that MBA education creates a profits-first 
mentality which is pursued without regard for 
moral considerations or social responsibility. 
 
CEP Perspectives 
CEP assesses a firm's degree of success in reduc- 
ing and minimizing its environmental impact 
(Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996: 1111). Most of ten, the 
impact is measured by the firm's policies, pro- 
grams, and observable outcomes (e.g., pollution 
prevention programs, use of recycled materials, 
and adherence to environmental regulations) re- 
lated to the environment (Wood, 1991). As such, 
CEP is an indicator of a firm's contribution toward 
environmental sustainability. While the CEP con- 
struct is fairly well accepted around the idea of 
reducing and minimizing impact on the environ- 
ment. two dominant paradigms divide CEP litera- 
ture-the normative perspective and the business 
case. Both perspectives generally share definitions 
and measures of CEP: it is their fundamental as- 
sumptions on the motivation and purpose that 
differ. 
 
Normative 
The normative case for CEP flows from the modern 
era of corporate social responsibility (CSR) advo- 
cated by scholars such as Bowen (1953), Frederick 
(1960), and Carroll. (1979). CSR is predicated on the 
assumption that  business has a moral  obligation 
to consider the societal impacts of its decisions 
and strategies. These sentiments are also seen 
within most definitions of environmental sustain- 
ability, which refer to society's ability to meet our 
needs today without compromising future genera- 
tions' ability to meet their own (World Commission 
on Economic Development, 1987). According to nor- 
mative arguments, CSR and sustainability con- 
cepts focus on what actions should be taken based 
on moral responsibilities. 
The normative case for CEP is also observed in 
normative stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Pres- 
ton, 1995), which makes arguments based on the 
theory of property and suggests that ownership 
provides a "limited" set of rights (Coase, 1960). 
These limited rights are actually relations be- 
tween individuals (Pejovich, 1990), including pro- 
tections from harmful uses of property. which re- 
quires  consideration  of  others,  or  non-owners. 
 
   
 
 
Thus, the "theoretical concept of private property 
clearly does not ascribe unlimited rights to owners 
and hence does not support the popular claim that 
the responsibility of managers is to act solely as 
agents for the shareowners" (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995: 84). Instead, "property rights give various 
groups a moral interest. commonly referred to as a 
stake, in the affairs of the corporation" (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995: 85). In sum, because shareholders 
do not have unlimited rights, firms have a moral 
obligation to consider their social and environ- 
mental impacts. Thus, the normative perspective 
views CEP as an end goal in and of itself (Jones & 
Wicks, 1999) because contributing to sustainability 
is a moral and social obligation. 
 
Business  Case 
The business case suggests that CEP provides the 
firm with financial returns, and thus, provides a 
business-relevant justification for environmental 
initiatives. Explanations for the returns from CEP 
are varied. For example, the natural resource- 
based view of the f irm argues that pollution pre- 
vention, product stewardship, and sustainable de- 
velopment strategies represent  key  managerial 
and firm capabilities and resources, which pro- 
duce a competitive advantage (Hart. 1995). Re- 
searchers have also argued that CEP reflects a 
firm's operational efficiency and capacity for in- 
novation (e.g., Aragon-Correa, 1998; Porter & van 
der Linde, 1995). Porter and Kramer (2006) suggest 
that normative  arguments  require  far  too broad 
of an engagement in social initiatives, and that a 
firm should selectively choose the specific social 
issues which present opportunities to  create 
shared wealth. When a firm engages in focused 
and proactive initiatives that are integrated with 
their core strategy, a competitive advantage will 
ensue. Instrumental stakeholder theory  also con- 
tributes to the business case for CEP, suggesting 
that  engagement  in  cooperative  and  ethical  be- 
. havior reduces agency and transaction costs, en- 
abling a firm to more effectively meet the needs 
of diverse stakeholder groups (Jones, 1995, Free- 
man & Evan, 1990). From an institutional perspec- 
tive (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Ro- 
wen, 1977) CEP provides legitimacy and 
reputational benefits to the firm as well (Hart, 
1995; Bansal & Clelland, 2004). Finally, the em- 
pirical tests of the relationship between CEP and 
corporate financial performance (CFP) have 
largely supported a positive relationship, includ- 
ing several meta-analyses (Dixon-Fowler, Slater, 
Romi, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 2009; Orlitzky, 
Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003). 
Upper Echelons 
Upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) 
serves as the underlying premise for the argu- 
ments to be developed below. Based on bounded 
rationality, upper echelons theory assumes that 
executives are not able to comprehend and process 
all available information, but rather situations are 
perceived with the executives' limited cognitive 
resources. In addition, the limited information per- 
ceived is filtered through an interpretation process 
influenced by the executive's experiences, values, 
and personality. These perceptions then influence 
the choices made, and eventually, f irm outcomes. 
In essence, because the executive is unable to 
make a completely rational decision based on all 
available information, their choices ultimately re- 
flect their individual differences. Extensive empir- 
ical evidence supports upper echelons theory, in- 
cluding meta-analytic evidence (Certo, Lester, 
Dalton, & Dalton, 2006). Moreover, this evidence is 
not confined to executives' influence over purely 
strategic results, but also includes social out- 
comes. Several recent studies have found CEO 
characteristics, such as tenure, f unctional back- 
ground, and international experience, influence a 
firm's corporate social performance (Simerly, 2003; 
Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009). Extending this stream 
of research, arguments will be developed below 
regarding the potential relationship between 
CEOs with MBAs and CEP. 
 
 
MBA EDUCATION AND CEP- 
COMPETING ARGUMENTS 
Based on the literature review above, reasonable 
and competing arguments can be made for nonex- 
istent, negative, and positive relationships be- 
tween CEO MBA education and CEP. Each possi- 
bility will be briefly explored. 
 
 
No Relationship 
The argument for no relationship flows from the 
irrelevance criticism of MBA education. The ir- 
relevance criticism suggests that MBA programs 
do not provide the necessary training and edu- 
cation that would assist a CEO in developing 
effective and profitable CEP strategies. While 
scholars have argued that integration of environ- 
mental sustainability initiatives with a f irm's 
core strategy and the interconnectedness of 
these strategies are vital for competitive advan- 
tage (Porter & Kramer, 2006; Hart, 1995), critics 
(Mintzberg, 2004) and empirical evidence (Na- 
varro, 2008) suggest that MBA programs do not 
 
   
 
promote such integration; rather, they remain in 
f unctional silos. Beyond integration, effective 
CEP strategies require successful coordination, 
communication, and collaboration between mul- 
tiple f unctions and departments within the orga- 
nization, as well as with stakeholders beyond 
organizational boundaries (Hart, 1995; Welf ord & 
Gouldson, 1993). However, the required sof t 
skills, such as communication and coordination, 
are those which are most notably lacking in MBA 
education (e.g., Jenkins & Reizenstein, 1984; Por- 
ter & McKibbin, 1988; Simpson, 2006). 
In addition, the irrelevance criticism suggests 
that MBA courses do not provide sufficient knowl- 
edge or ability to make business-relevant ethical 
decisions. From the normative perspective, sus- 
tainability ef forts such as CEP are a social respon- 
sibility that require the ability to evaluate ethical 
situations and make moral judgments (Madagan, 
2008). Practicing managers acknowledge  that 
many ethical business decisions are not black and 
white, but instead involve multiple vantage points 
and require complex judgment calls (Lewicki, 
2005). However, most MBA programs have no re- 
quired ethics course (Evans & Robertson, 2003). 
Some schools attempt to integrate ethics through 
the core coursework. which places the responsibil- 
ity on faculty to integrate ethics into their courses. 
However, this integration is difficult to monitor 
(Evans, Trevino, & Weaver, 2006). Even worse, busi- 
ness school deans indicate that the major impedi- 
ment to increasing stand-alone ethics courses is a 
lack of faculty interest (Evans & Robertson, 2003), 
which suggests that ethics may not be well inte- 
grated into the core courses being taught by the 
faculty. As a result, not only have MBAs received 
little training on how to handle ethical issues 
when they arise, but without such training, they 
may not even recognize their firm's impact on en- 
vironmental sustainability as an ethical or moral 
issue. 
Based on the irrelevance criticism, CEOs with 
an MBA have received little additional training 
that would enhance their firm's CEP. Many im- 
portant issues necessary for addressing CEP 
(e.g., integration, communication, complex ethi- 
cal judgments) are lacking in MBA education. 
Thus, a CEO with an MBA degree has little-to-no 
advantage over CEOs without an MBA in terms 
of their training for the necessary knowledge and 
abilities related to CEP. In other words, because 
the program lacks the relevant content and train- 
ing, there is likely no relationship between CEO 
MBA education and CEP. 
 
Negative Relationship 
As opposed to the irrelevance criticism, the profits- 
first criticism does suggest an impact based on 
MBA education. However, the anticipated direction 
of the effect differs depending on the CEP perspec- 
tive (normative or business-case) under consider- 
ation. The negative relationship argument flows 
from the profits-first criticism of MBA education 
when considering the normative perspective of 
CEP. The normative perspective suggests that CEP 
is an obligation, and thus, the motivation for en- 
gaging in CEP activities is out of a moral respon- 
sibility to society. However, the profits-first criti- 
cism suggests that MBA education indoctrinates 
future executives to consider all decisions in eco- 
nomic terms without regard for ethical consider- 
ations (Giacalone & Thompson, 2006). One of 
Ghoshal's (2005) primary arguments is that our 
amoral theories have released students to pursue 
profits without regard for social responsibility, 
which has led to many of the recent business scan- 
dals and unethical decisions by executives. 
Ghoshal does not simply imply ambivalence  to- 
ward ethical decisions, but rather that the assump- 
tion of opportunism in our theories creates a self - 
fulfilling prophecy and leads graduates to take 
advantage of ethically questionable situations, to 
their own benefit. 
Based on the profits-first criticism, MBA educa- 
tion actively creates future executives with a nar- 
row, profit-driven focus and a decreased sense of 
social responsibility. As Leavitt (1989: 39) asserts, 
MBA programs create "critters with lopsided 
brains, icy hearts, and shrunken souls." Thus, 
MBAs may view the pursuit of corporate environ- 
mental initiatives for moral obligatory reasons as 
inappropriate and irresponsible to the firm and its 
shareholders. Therefore, given that the motivation 
to engage in CEP initiatives from a normative per- 
spective is out of a sense of social responsibility, 
MBA-educated CEOs could be expected to be far 
less concerned about CEP compared to non-MBA 
educated counterparts. As opposed to the  irrele- 
vance criticisms, the profits-first criticism does 
suggest an influence of MBA education. From the 
normative perspective of CEP, the profits-first crit- 
icism would suggest a negative relationship be- 
tween CEO MBA education and CEP. 
 
 
Positive Relationship 
Although sustainability and environmental issues 
are not extensively incorporated into the curricula 
of most MBA programs (Benn & Dunphy, 2009), 
when  CEP  topics  are  discussed,  it  is  generally 
 
   
 
 
within an economic context. As Giacalone and 
Thompson (2006: 268) explain, "virtually everything 
in our course content is justified by, tied to, or 
infused with the financial bottom line." In other 
words, when  environmental  issues are discussed 
in business schools, it is not the normative  per- 
spective being taught. but rather the business- 
case, that profits can be gained from engaging in 
such activities (Giacalone & Thompson, 2006). In 
fact, research has found that business  education 
significantly enhances students' belief that sus- 
tainability is an important element of firm perf or- 
mance (Neubaum et al.. 2009). As stated above, the 
profits-first criticism argues that MBA education 
creates an organization-centered worldview that 
promotes the accumulation of wealth above all else 
(Giacalone & Thompson, 2006). Thus, Ghoshal's (2005) 
assertion regarding the self-f ulfilling prophecy of op- 
portunism would suggest that MBA graduates will 
actively seek out and take advantage of any oppor- 
tunity to create wealth for themselves and their 
firms-including CEP. 
From the business-case perspective, the motiva- 
tion for CEP activities is financial. As the profits- 
first criticism of MBA education suggests, MBA 
graduates will pursue profits by taking advantage 
of any opportunity. Moreover, CEOs with an MBA 
education may be more aware of the business case 
for CEP from their coursework and are actively 
trained to seek out the potential economic benefits. 
Thus, MBA-educated CEOs could make a rational 
choice to pursue environmental initiatives in an 
effort to maximize prof its. Based on the profits-first 
criticism of MBA education, the normative perspec- 
tive of CEP suggests a negative relationship; how- 
ever, the business-case perspective of CEP sug- 
gests the opposite effect. 
 
Research Question 
The arguments presented above provide contra- 
dicting possibilities. The irrelevance criticism sug- 
gests there is likely no relationship between CEO 
MBA education and CEP. The profits-first criticism 
of MBA education suggests a negative relationship 
from the normative perspective of CEP, but a pos- 
itive relationship from the business-case perspec- 
tive. Depending on which argument is supported, 
drastically different implications will ensue. If no 
relationship is found, the irrelevance criticism 
would be the likely explanation. If a negative re- 
lationship is discovered, the profits-first criticism 
would be supported, implying that MBA education 
erodes students' sense of moral and social respon- 
sibility. Finally, if the relationship is positive, MBA 
education could be said to actually have a positive 
outcome for all stakeholders involved (i.e., triple 
bottom-line) and would at the very least refute 
some of the irrelevance criticisms. Given the diver- 
gence of possibilities, we  do not offer a formal 
hypothesis, but rather pose a research question to 
be subjected to empirical analysis: 
Research Question: What is the relationship  be- 
tween  CEO  MBA  ed ucation 
and CEP? 
 
 
METHOD 
Sample and Data Sources 
The sample consisted of S&P 500 firms and CEOs 
from 2004. Because the research question in this 
study involves CEOs' long-term influence over firm 
outcomes, CEOs with tenure of less than 1 year 
(n = 76) were removed, leaving a sample of 426 (two 
firms were led by dual CEOs). The sample was 
further reduced by cases of missing data (n = IO), 
which left a final sample of 416. The average CEO 
age was 56 (SD = 6.9), average company tenure 
was 18.2 years (SD = 11.7), and average tenure as 
CEO was 7.6 years (SD = 6.8). In addition, the CEOs 
in our  sample represented  firms  from  53 different 
industries based  on their two-digit  level SIC code. 
Three independent data sources were compiled for 
empirical testing. First, we gathered CEP data from 
KLD Research  and Analytics  Inc., an independent 
investment research firm specializing in firm ratings 
of  environmental.  social.  and  governance  perfor- 
mance for use in investment decisions. KI.D's ratings 
of CEP have become frequently employed within ac- 
ademic research (e.g., Coombs, & Gilley, 2005; John- 
son & Greening, 1999; Turban & Greening, 1996) for a 
variety of reasons. First, KLD tracks multiple indica- 
tors of both strength and concern for each firm's im- 
pact  on the environment--as  opposed  to restricting 
environmental performance to a single domain, such 
as toxic releases (i.e., TRI). Researchers also employ 
the KLD ratings due to the decreased probability for 
reporting  bias.  KLD  gathers  data  from  multiple 
sources,  including  extensive  inspection  of  public 
records,  surveys,  and  even  on-site  facility  inspec- 
tions (Berman, Wicks, Koth, & Jones, 1999). Not only is 
data gathered  from  multiple  sources, but  it is also 
gathered  in  a  uniform  fashion  by  knowledgeable 
individuals not affiliated with the focal firm so that 
ratings  are  applied  consistently  to  all  firms  rated 
(Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
Second, all CEO biographical information (i.e., 
education, functional background, tenure) was ob- 
tained from Spencer Stuart--a global executive 
search firm. Spencer Stuart's data was compiled 
from the following sources: Marquis Who's Who in 
 
  
 
America; The Corporate Yellow Book; 50,000 Lead- 
ing U.S. Corporations-Business Trends; Standard 
and Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors and 
Executives; QuestNT (Spencer Stuart's proprietary 
database); corporate websites and press releases; 
company proxies; OneSource.com; Hoovers.com; 
and information requests directly to the firm when 
necessary. 
Finally, firm-level performance data (industry 
classifications, firm size, and prior financial per- 
formance) were retrieved from COMPUSTAT. The 
data from KLD, Spencer Stuart. and COMPUSTAT 
were merged and analyzed for testing this study's 
research  question. 
 
Measures 
CEP 
KLD's index includes multiple dichotomous indica- 
tors of environmental "strengths" and "concerns." 
Strength items include production of environmen- 
tally beneficial products, pollution prevention, use 
of recycled materials, use of clean energy, and 
"other" proactive environmental activities. The 
concern items include hazardous waste practices, 
regulatory compliance, production of ozone deplet- 
ing and agricultural chemicals, emissions, and 
other environmental controversies. The concern 
items were reversed coded, and all items were 
aggregated into a composite variable representing 
CEP (Coombs & Gilley, 2005; Johnson & Greening, 
1999; Turban & Greening, 1996; Waddock & Graves, 
1997). To help alleviate concerns of extreme yearly 
fluctuations, we calculated this composite for both 
2003 and 2004. Given the high intercorrelation (a = 
.83) we aggregated the 2003 and 2004 composite to 
form our CEP measure. As an index, a  higher 
score indicates a firm possesses a greater number 
of CEP indicators while lower scores indicate 
lesser CEP. 
 
CEO MBA Education 
The CEO's attainment of an MBA was measured as 
a categorical variable indicating their possession 
of an MBA degree or lack thereof. 
 
 
Control Measures 
In order to rule out possible alternative explana- 
tions for any discovered relationship, several con- 
trol variables were included in our analysis. These 
variables were selected based on prior research 
findings and to rule out potential confounds with 
the present study. 
 
CEO Functional Background 
CEO functional backgrounds, specifically output- 
oriented work experience (e.g., marketing, sales) 
have been shown to influence  decision  making 
and firm outcomes including social outcomes (e.g.. 
Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009). Therefore, functional 
backgrounds were controlled by coding back- 
grounds as either output (e.g.. marketing, sales) or 
throughput (e.g., engineering, operations) based on 
Hambrick and Mason's classification (1984). 
 
CEO Age and Tenure 
The age of the CEO was included as a control 
variable. In addition, the number of years as CEO 
was used as a control measure for CEO tenure. 
 
CEO Education Level 
An argument could be made that any effects from 
MBA education on CEP are actually the effects of 
education in general instead of the specific effects 
of an MBA. Therefore, a variable was created to 
account for the level of educational attainment by 
the CEO. The measure ranged from 0 to 3 with a 0 
indicating no college degree (9 CEOs; 2.2% of the 
sample); a 1 indicating the CEOs highest educa- 
tional attainment was a bachelors degree (139 
CEOs; 33.4%); 2 indicating the CEO's highest edu- 
cational attainment was a master's degree (198 
CEOs; 47.6%); and 3 indicating the attainment of a 
doctorate degree (70 CEOs; 16.8%). 
 
Industry CEP, Firm Size, and Prior Financial 
Performance 
Industry was controlled by using the CEP industry 
average based on the 2-digit SIC code. Firm size 
was measured using the natural log of sales for 
each firm. Prior firm f inancial performance was 
measured using the return on assets (ROA) from 
2003 for each firm. 
 
Analysis and Results 
Table 1 provides means, standard deviations. and 
bivariate correlations for each variable. As a pre- 
liminary  examination  of  the  research  question, 
CEO MBA education is found to have a significant 
and positive correlation with CEP (r = .10; p < .05). 
Table 2 provides additional detail. Demonstrating 
that the mean CEP is greater for firms with a CEO 
possessing  an  MBA  than  for  firms  with  a  CEO 
without an MBA. 
Given the categorical nature of the independent 
 
   
 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive  Statistics  and  Correlations  (N  = 416) 
 
Variable 
 
1. CEP 
2. CEO MBA Education 
3. CEO Age 
4. CEO Tenure 
S. CEO Education Level 
M 
 
2.79 
SD 
 
.69 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
.41 .49 .10*        
SS.96 6.93 -.04 -.13**       
7.62 6.77 .091 -.091 .44**      
1.80 .74 -.OS .30** .16** .03     
6. CEO Functional Background .30 .46 -.OS .04 -.22** -.18** -.07    
7. Industry CEP 2.88 .20 .38** .03 -.08 .OS -.03 .091   
8. Firm Size 8.86 1.19 -.2s·· .02 .12· -.OS -.01 -.02 -.24**  
9. Prior Financial Performance .04 .07 .10· -.14** .06 .10* -.06 .11* .OS -.02 
1p < .10. * p < .OS. •• p < .01 (two-tailed). 
 
variable and the necessity of controls, an ANCOVA 
was deemed the appropriate formal test of the 
research question. ANCOVA allows us to deter- 
mine the variance explained by the categorical 
variable of interest (i.e., MBA-educated CEOs) af ter 
accounting for several firm- and individual-level 
characteristics. Table 3 includes the ANCOVA re- 
sults, including the significance and  effect  sizes 
(112) for each variable. Of the control variables in- 
cluded, industry. f irm size. prior financial perfor- 
mance, and CEO functional background had a sig- 
nificant effect (p < .OS). while CEO age, tenure, and 
education level were not significant (p > .10). The 
independent variable of interest. CEO MBA educa- 
tion, was found to have a signif icant effect (p < .05). 
Thus, CEO MBA education has a signif icant and 
positive association with CEP. 
We also ran the same ANCOVA on the 2003 and 
2004 CEP composites separately and found the 
same pattern of results for the effect of MBA edu- 
cation on 2003 CEP (F = 8.720; p = .003) and 2004 
CEP (F = 5.438; p = .020). 
 
Post-Hoc Analyses 
Given the significant positive result, we elected to 
conduct additional analyses based on the asser- 
tion by critics that any positive effects of MBA 
education are not the result of MBA education it- 
self, but rather result from the recruiting. screen- 
ing. and networking of top-ranked programs (Pfef - 
MBAs from highly ranked programs should yield 
significantly greater benefits than MBAs from 
lower or un-ranked programs. due to their candi- 
date  selection. 
The BusinessWeek rankings from 1988 were used 
as our measure of MBA program ranking. Given 
the average age of our sample (56), most of the 
CEOs attended their MBA programs prior to 1988. 
However, the  first available rankings from 1988 
were used, based on research demonstrating their 
extremely high stability over time (Morgeson, & 
Nahrgang. 2008). Using the same control variables 
included in Table 3, an ANCOVA was used to com- 
pare the CEP of firms whose CEO had an MBA from 
a top-10 program (n = 74) to firms whose CEO had 
an MBA from outside the top-10 programs (n = 96). 
The results showed no signif icant diff erence in 
CEP (F = .003; p = .960). This analysis was ex- 
tended comparing MBAs from top-20 programs (n = 
100) to MBAs outside the top 20 (n = 70) and still 
found no significant difference (F = .814; p = .368). 
Finally. to assess if there were diff erences in CEP 
within the firms whose CEO had an MBA from a 
top-20 program (n = 100). the same control vari- 
ables were included  in a regression  analysis and 
 
TABLE 3 
ANCOVA  Results for CEP 
 
 
F 
Variable Value p Value Tl2 
 
fer  & Fong,  2002).  This  assertion  suggests  that  
 Industry CEP Sl.988 .000 .113 
 Firm Size 13.9S8 .000 .033 
TABLE 2 Prior Financial  Performance 4.S07 .034 .011 
CEP Means, Standard Deviations, and Sample CEO Age .002 .96S .000 
Sizes CEO Tenure 1.061 .304 .003 
 CEO Education Level 2.423 .120 .006 
M SD n CEO Functional Background 
CEO MBA Education 
4.088 
7.36S 
.044 
.007 
.010 
.018 
CEP for CEO with MBA 2.86S 0.611 170     
CEP for CEO without MBA 2.730 0.722 246 R2 = .203. 
Adjusted R2 = .187. 
 
   
 
the top-20 rankings were used as the independent 
variable. Again, no significant effect was found for 
the program rankings (t = .466; p = .642). 
One other post-hoc analysis was also conducted. 
While many control variables were included in the 
original analyses, a significant additional concern 
remains-reverse causality. It could be that high 
CEP firms are selecting CEOs with MBAs or that 
CEOs with MBAs are self-selecting into firms with 
higher CEP. To explore this possibility, we ob- 
tained KLD data from 1991 (first available year of 
KLD data) through our primary analysis year (2004) 
and acquired each f irm's CEP score on the year in 
which the CEO took office. The sample size for this 
analysis (n = 268) was reduced for two reasons: 
Some CEOs had start dates which preceded  1991, 
and many of the firms rated by KLD in 2004 were 
not rated by KLD in prior years. Using our sample 
of 268, a t test revealed no significant difference in 
the hiring year CEP (t = -.158; p = .874) based on 
incoming CEOs with an MBA (n = 114) and those 
without (n = 154). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our purpose in this study was to address the con- 
cern that MBA education teaches "ecologically un- 
sound tactics that may bring planetary suicide" 
(Giacalone & Thompson, 2006: 268). To this end, we 
considered multiple criticisms of MBA education 
and multiple perspectives on CEP. A review of the 
literature resulted in three possible propositions 
(i.e., no relationship, positive, and negative), and 
thus, the question of how MBA-educated CEOs 
might influence their firms' CEP was subjected to 
an empirical test. The results of this study suggest 
that CEOs with MBAs have a positive influence on 
CEP. Even after accounting for f irm characteristics 
(industry, size, and prior f inancial performance) 
and individual-level characteristics (age, tenure, 
functional background, level of education) we still 
found that CEO MBA education resulted in higher 
levels of CEP. Moreover, our post-hoc analysis re- 
vealed no significant differences in results when 
MBA program rankings were considered. This is 
contrary to claims by critics that MBAs from top- 
tier programs may be associated with more mean- 
ingf ul outcomes due to differences such as candi- 
date quality and program selectivity (Pfeffer & 
Fong, 2002). Our results imply that consistency in 
MBA curricula across programs (Porter & Mc- 
Kibbin, 1988) leads to similar CEP-related effects, 
regardless of the school's ranking, which rein- 
forces the claim that it is the MBA training itself 
making a difference. Finally, additional post-hoc 
analysis revealed that CEOs with MBAs do not 
 
appear to self-select into firms with higher CEP nor 
are firms with higher CEP more likely to hire CEOs 
with MBA education. As important. this finding 
strengthens the results of this study by addressing 
the concern of reverse causality. Taking all analy- 
ses into consideration, this study suggests that 
CEOs with MBAs are positively associated with 
CEP and that this association is not the result of 
firm-level characteristics, individual-level charac- 
teristics, MBA program ranking, self-selection, or 
selection criteria. Instead, these findings suggest 
that the CEO's MBA education itself has a positive 
influence on their firm's CEP. 
 
Implications 
Our findings have important implications for a 
variety of stakeholder groups, including educators, 
business, and society. For educators and MBA ad- 
ministrators, our findings suggest that there is  a 
benefit to an MBA education, contradicting the 
prominent criticism that MBA programs are irrele- 
vant (Mintzberg, 2004; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002). While 
we are unable to ref ute specific issues, such as the 
lack of sof t skills training and functional silos, this 
study does suggest that there is an effect of  MBA 
education. In addition, contrary to other studies 
which have found effects of business education 
(e.g., Frank & Schulze, 2000; Williams, Barrett, & 
Brabston, 2000), this outcome is positive. CEOs 
with MBAs are making a positive contribution  to 
the environmental sustainability of our planet. 
However, while the positive outcome discovered in 
this study may be encouraging, we must also rec- 
ognize that our findings appear consistent with the 
profits-first criticism prevalent in the literature. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to directly  test the 
motivation of these  CEOs for pursuing CEP (i.e., 
normative or business-case); however, based  on 
our review of MBA education literature, we are not 
optimistic that the motivation extends  beyond 
wealth creation. The MBA curricula  is rooted in a 
long history of agency and transaction-cost per- 
spectives, which create an "organization-centered 
worldview" (Giacalone & Thompson, 2006), and if 
sustainability is taught at all, it  is primarily  from 
an economic standpoint.  Given  that  students' 
moral philosophy doesn't appear to change during 
their time in business school (Neubaum et al.. 
2009), the more plausible explanation is that MBAs 
have greater recognition of  the economic benefits 
of CEP (e.g., greater levels of innovation; cost sav- 
ings through efficiency gains; reputational advan- 
tages) and thus increase CEP solely in pursuit of 
profits. In other words, CEOs with MBAs most 
likely  seek  what  they  perceive  as win-win  situa- 
 
   
 
 
tions by pursuing only CEP activities that have a 
significant and perhaps immediate impact the 
firm's bottom line. These select CEP-oriented activ- 
ities are not necessarily those that result in the 
largest environmental impact but may instead be 
the "low-hanging fruits" that are most likely to 
increase profitability. If so, these CEOs may pur- 
sue short-term profitability gains through CEP in- 
itiatives that are relatively  easy and inexpensive 
to implement without regard for reducing the long- 
term environmental footprint of their firms. 
Therefore, while MBA education has an influ- 
ence over graduates' pursuit of CEP, perhaps we 
should ask whether that influence could be ex- 
panded to impact students' ethical decisions and 
sense of social responsibility and not simply the 
business case for social initiatives. As educators, 
socialized and trained according to this same par- 
adigm, MBA professors may be uncomfortable in- 
tegrating "moral based" arguments into business 
courses. Further, educators may feel that doing so 
jeopardizes one's reputation as well as the legiti- 
macy of our discipline and should be left to edu- 
cators in other disciplines (i.e., liberal arts) where 
such normative-based discussions have been tra- 
ditionally viewed as more appropriate. As a result. 
even subject matters such as environmental sus- 
tainability, laden with normative implications, are 
more of ten taught in MBA courses from an economic- 
centered viewpoint (Giacalone & Thompson, 2006), 
focusing on overarching questions such as "When 
does it pay to be green?" without asking students 
to also consider, "What is the 'right' thing to do?" 
On one hand, our results suggest that MBA pro- 
grams make a difference by promoting a profits- 
first mentality, which leads to higher CEP. On the 
other hand, this does not mean that there isn't more 
to do in education around business and environ- 
mental sustainability. We are not advocating a 
dismissal of the business-case perspective for so- 
cial issues, but rather a balance. Given that envi- 
ronmental sustainability is inherently a complex 
multifaceted issue, educators may consider if both 
CEP perspectives (i.e., normative and business- 
case) are necessary for critical discourse and 
should be integrated into MBA curriculum. 
The results of this study also have important 
implications for business. As a result of regulatory 
changes, stakeholder pressures, and recognition of 
potential competitive opportunities, firms are in- 
creasingly recognizing the importance of environ- 
mental issues in strategy formulation and decision 
making (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Elkington, 1994; Hart. 
1995). Given the f indings of this study, environmen- 
tally conscientious firms and firms concerned with 
the competitive advantages of CEP may want to 
consider the education of their executives. Specif - 
ically, firms may consider implementing MBA 
tuition-assistance programs for employees or ac- 
tively selecting and promoting managers  with 
MBAs in pursuit of such efforts. 
Finally, this study also has important societal- 
level implications. Given that the practices of 
large companies can significantly impact the nat- 
ural environment (Samuelson, 2006), sustainability 
imperatives require that managers of these f irms 
make decisions that do not compromise the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs. En- 
vironmental sustainability is an important  issue 
for the long-term viability of all organizations 
given that issues such as drinking water, clean air, 
and safe food are necessities for all stakeholders 
(e.g., employees, customers). Our results imply that 
through CEP, MBA programs have an important 
positive impact on environmental sustainability, 
and thus society as a whole. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
This study is not without limitations. First, while 
we did find a positive relationship between CEO 
MBA education and CEP, we were unable to di- 
rectly test the CEO's motivation or provide a defin- 
itive explanation for the MBA-CEP correlation. 
Based on the existing literature, there is very little 
support for a normative motivation and extensive 
support for the business case as a motivator. As 
such, we believe that MBAs are more likely than 
non-MBAs to recognize the instrumental benefits of 
CEP. However, other possibilities remain. Perhaps 
MBA courses that teach stakeholder theory (e.g., 
organizational theory) lead to an increased focus 
on environmental stakeholder needs. Alterna- 
tively, there may be a diffusion of environmental 
practices within the social networks of MBA stu- 
dents and alumni, which facilitates the CEO's abil- 
ity to pursue CEP. Thus, future research may ex- 
plore whether MBA-educated CEOs pursue CEP 
out of moral obligation, for financial gain, due to a 
focus on stakeholders, through their social net- 
works, some combination, or due to other factors 
which we have not yet considered. 
The possibility also remains that a third variable 
could account for our discovered relationship. For 
example, perhaps there is a personality variable 
which leads to pursuit of both MBA education and 
CEP. Or perhaps one's socioeconomic background 
has differential influence on these outcomes. 
While our analyses controlled for a number of al- 
ternative individual, educational, and firm-based 
explanations for our f indings, the possibility re- 
mains that there is an additional psychological  or 
 
   
 
sociological variable not being captured in the 
current model. Thus, the underlying micropro- 
cesses which influence the MBA CEO's decision 
making regarding CEP remain in question. By find- 
ing the first evidence of a link between MBA edu- 
cation and CEP we have provided a foundation 
for f uture studies to utilize experiments, ques- 
tionnaires, or interviews of CEO MBAs in order to 
help open this black box and provide important 
insights. 
This study is also limited by its measure of CEP. 
The KLD index utilizes multiple indicators, a wide 
variety of sources, is more  comprehensive,  and 
was intentionally selected over other commonly 
used and more narrow indicators of CEP (e.g., TRI). 
However, the  multifaceted  and complex  construct 
of CEP is admittedly difficult to fully capture, and 
although scholars have pointed to the strengths of 
the KLD ratings (Berman, Wicks, Koth, & Jones, 
1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997), critics have also 
questioned the reliability and validity of its data 
(e.g., Entine, 2003) and its lack of a weighting 
scheme for the various dimensions (Graves & Wad- 
dock. 1994). Therefore, we may not have fully cap- 
tured the broad range of  activities that  contribute 
to CEP in this  study. Future research may utilize 
other sources or measures of CEP to replicate the 
findings presented   here. 
The nature of our sample also limits the gener- 
alizability of our findings. First. the majority of 
CEOs in our sample earned MBA degrees from 
U.S.-based institutions, and the firms in our sam- 
ple are all based in the United States. It is feasible 
that MBA programs in other national contexts, par- 
ticularly more collectivist-oriented countries, may 
have differential effects on CEP. Future cross- 
cultural studies would help us better understand 
these potential differences. In addition, while we 
know that MBA education has influence long after 
an individual completes a program (e.g., Williams 
et al., 2000), most of the CEOs in our sample com- 
pleted MBA programs 25-30 years ago, which may 
have a different influence than MBA education to- 
day. However, prior research suggests that MBA 
content and curriculum has become institutional- 
ized and has not significantly changed since the 
1960s (Davis & Botkin, 1994). Even with the increas- 
ing emphasis on environmental issues, only 7% of 
MBA students indicate that their universities of - 
fer relevant environmental management-related 
courses among core offerings (DiMeglio, 2005), sug- 
gesting that MBA programs respond to change rel- 
atively slowly. Nevertheless, some schools are be- 
ginning to integrate sustainability into the core 
curriculum (DiMeglio, 2005). The question of how 
this  curriculum  will  be  presented,  however,  re- 
 
mains to be seen. Yet. it is possible that the nature 
of the MBA-CEP relationship may change in the 
future, particularly if more normative perspectives 
are introduced. 
 
CONCLUSION 
MBA programs have been the subject of a long line 
of criticisms claiming that MBA education is irrel- 
evant (e.g., Dreher et al., 1985; Ghoshal. 2005; Leon- 
hardt. 2000; Mintzberg, 2005; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002) or 
results in a "prof its-first" mentality, which has con- 
tributed to opportunism and unethical decision 
making (e.g., Ghoshal. 2005; Giacalone & Thomp- 
son, 2006). In contrast. we demonstrate a signifi- 
cant positive relationship between CEOs with 
MBAs and CEP. While addressing the concern over 
a lack of empirical research focusing on criticisms 
of MBA education (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002), these re- 
sults provide meaningful insights and a new per- 
spective into the long-standing debate regarding 
whether MBAs matter. Further, while most prior 
research focuses on individual-level outcomes of 
MBA education (e.g., compensation), this study ad- 
dresses an important firm-level outcome with im- 
plications for global sustainability. 
The empirical results presented here refute the 
irrelevance criticism of MBA education, which 
should serve as an encouragement to educators by 
providing a glimmer of hope to what has become a 
very dark view of MBA programs. These results 
suggest that educators are making  a  difference 
and that MBA programs do matter. However, the 
most likely interpretation of the results also lends 
some support to the profits-first criticism of MBA 
education and suggests that MBA graduates pur- 
sue a "moral" cause with a material motivation. 
Thus. these results should not serve as a sign that 
all is well with MBA education. Instead, these re- 
sults should serve as an encouragement that MBA 
education makes a difference, but also that much 
room for improvement remains. 
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